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In recent years, corporate governance scholarship has begun to focus on the most
common distribution of public corporation ownership: outside of the United States and
the United Kingdom, publicly owned corporations often have a controlling shareholder.1
The presence of a controlling shareholder is especially prevalent in developing countries.
In Asia, for example, some two-thirds of public corporations have one, most of whom
represent family ownership.2 The Law and Finance literature, exemplified by a series of
articles by combinations of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shliefer,
Robert Vishny and others, treats the prevalence of controlling shareholders as the result
of bad law;3 more specifically, controlling shareholders are ubiquitous in countries that
do not adequately protect minority shareholders from the extraction of private benefits of
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control by dominant shareholders. The logic is straightforward. Controlling shareholders
will not part with control because that will expose them to exploitation by a new
controlling shareholder who acquires a controlling position in the market.
The Law and Finance account of the distribution of ownership, while compelling
as far as it goes, is at best partial. I have argued elsewhere that the syllogism is too
simple to explain all controlling shareholder systems because we find significant numbers
of controlling shareholders in countries with good law.4 If jurisdictions that adequately
protect minority shareholders have a significant number of companies with a controlling
shareholder, something other than bad law is at work. And while the link between
shareholder protection and distribution of shareholdings remains persuasive with respect
to countries with poor shareholder protection – minority shares change hands at a
significant discount to controlling shares in such jurisdictions5 – it still leaves important
parts of even this landscape unexplained. It does not, for example, explain why in Asian
countries controlling shareholders are likely to be families. And it does not explain,
given poor shareholder protection, why we observe minority shareholders at all. Since
the Law and Finance account does not posit the existence of observable limits on how
much of a minority shareholder’s investment the controlling shareholder can extract, why
is not the value of minority shares in such jurisdictions and, it follows, the number of
minority shareholders, zero?
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In this article, I want to continue the effort to complicate the controlling
shareholder taxonomy by looking at the impact of bad law in a very different sense than
contemplated by the Law and Finance literature. In particular, I want to address the
effect on the distribution of shareholdings when a jurisdiction provides not only poor
minority shareholder protection, but poor commercial law generally. Put differently, the
goal is to play out the implications for the distribution of shareholders when the focus in
not on conditions in the capital market, where poor shareholder protection has figured so
prominently, but on conditions in the product market, where the driving legal influence is
the quality of commercial law that supports the corporation’s actual business activities.
Can bad commercial law help explain shareholder distribution?
In an important sense, the Law and Finance literature’s sharp focus on minority
shareholder protection treats the shareholder distribution as independent of what the
company actually does. In Miller-Modigliani terms, the distribution of shareholdings is
irrelevant to the company’s actual activities. Just as the division of capital between debt
and equity on the right side of the balance sheet does not, under the irrelevancy
propositions, affect the value of real assets on the left side of the balance sheet,6 the line
that separates the two sides of the balance sheet also isolates the distribution of equity
among shareholders from the value of the corporation’s assets. My hypothesis is that bad
commercial law, as opposed to just poor minority shareholder protection as contemplated
by the Law and Finance literature, breaks down the separation between equity
distribution and firm value. I posit that that the presence of a controlling shareholder and,
in particular, a family controlling shareholder, allows the corporation to better conduct its

6

See, e.g., Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance 407-09 (7th ed.
2005).

3

business, but in a way quite different than the potential for a controlling shareholder to
more effectively police the agency conflict between management and shareholders, the
productive advantage typically ascribed to a controlling shareholder structure.7
Broadening the concept of “bad law” to take into account not only the quality of
minority shareholder protection, but also the quality of commercial law more generally,
frames the problem. In an environment of bad commercial law, a corporation’s basic
business depends on its capacity to engage in self-enforcing exchange – that is,
commercial transactions where the parties perform their contractual obligations because it
is in their self-interest to perform, not because of the threat of legal sanction. With bad
commercial law, exchange must be self enforcing because there are neither authoritative
rules, nor an effective judicial system to enforce those obligations.8 Transactions in this
circumstance take place in a reputation market, which substitutes for law (or its shadow)
as a means to assure that parties perform their contractual obligations.
Framing the problem as one of commercial contracting in a bad law environment
suggests a very different function for shareholder distribution than contemplated by the
Law and Finance literature. When commerce must take place in a reputation market, in
which a corporation’s business must be effected through self-enforcing transactions, the
distribution of shareholdings, and particularly the presence of family ownership, facilitate
the development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a corporation’s
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commercial success.9 More speculatively, the role of reputation in the product market
may help explain why we observe publicly held minority shares in the capital market
even though poor shareholder protection does not impose a formal limit on the amount of
private benefits that a controlling shareholder can extract. If bad behavior toward
minority shareholders can affect the corporation’s reputation in the product market as
well as the capital market, then self-imposed limits on controlling shareholders’
extraction of private benefits may derive from their concern over success in the product
market. Indeed, the corporation may have minority shareholders at all, despite the high
price of equity capital in the face of poor minority protection, as a kind of hostage to
support its reputation in the product market.
My ambition here is to offer a working hypothesis, an account neither formal in
method, nor deeply grounded in the history and structure of particular jurisdictions.10
What happens when we turn the capital market-oriented bad law account of concentrated
ownership on its head, and focus instead on how product market-oriented bad law
influences the distribution of equity? The value of so a minimalist an approach lies in
framing the issue clean of the complications inevitably associated with particular
jurisdictions, with the hope that, if the account proves intriguing, it then will be of
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assistance in the real task – that of understanding the development of particular national
markets, and one of the foundations of economic development more generally.
Part I sets out the basic problem of commercial exchange in a jurisdiction without
effective commercial law. Part II develops how conducting business through a
corporation can facilitate reputation formation and maintenance. Part III examines how
family ownership can improve a corporation’s capacity to act as a reputation bearer in the
product market. Part IV then speculates on why a controlling family shareholder might
voluntarily limit the amount of private benefit extraction from minority shareholders not
because its treatment of minority shareholders affects its ability to raise additional equity
capital, but because bad behavior will degrade its reputation in the product market. Part
V addresses a final speculation, now about the dynamic character of controlling
shareholder systems in developing countries. The role of shareholder distribution
described here is one that supports reputation-based product markets. Such markets are
limited in scale so that further economic development requires a transition to institutions
that support anonymous product markets – a rule of law-based commercial system with
effective formal enforcement. The transition, however, will be impeded both by the
particular characteristics of existing institutions – what Paul Milgrom and John Roberts
call “supermodularity11 – and by the political influence of those who have large
investments that are specific to a reputation-based product market. Part VI concludes by
framing the question with which we are left: how does the necessary transition take place
in the face of structural and political barriers?12 More specifically, does the answer relate
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to the recent historical pattern of economically benevolent dictators observed during the
transition period in many countries that have successfully developed?
I. The Structure of Reputation Markets
In its most simple form, a self-enforcing commercial arrangement can be based
only on the expectation of a long horizon of future transactions. Where two parties
expect to engage in repeated transactions, neither will have an incentive to misbehave in
a particular transaction because bad behavior by one party in a transaction will be
punished by the counterparty, whether by retaliating in future transactions, changing the
terms of future transactions or refusing to engage in future transactions at all.13 This
simple reciprocity model has significant limitations. First, it requires the expectation of a
lengthy relationship to avoid the incentive to cheat. In the absence of future dealings, one
party has no reason not to cheat on the current exchange. And even the expectation of
future rounds may be insufficient to assure self-enforcement if the number of rounds and
their present value is small compared to the payoffs from cheating.14 Second, and for my
purpose more important, the requirement of long lasting bilateral exchange to support a
self enforcing transaction severely limits the size of the economy. Individuals are limited
in the number of long term trading partners they can support.
To increase the number of parties with whom one can trade requires adding the
concept of reputation. If one party will trade with others in the future, but may not trade
with any single party repeatedly – that is, if trade will be multilateral rather than bilateral
– self enforcement still will work if the party’s behavior in one exchange becomes known
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to future counterparties. In other words, to support multilateral exchange the party must
become known beyond its current trading partners – it must develop a reputation.
Self enforcing commercial exchanges when individual parties do not necessarily
expect to transact with each other in the future – reputation-based markets – require a
number of supporting factors. First, parties must expect to engage in similar transactions
in the future, even if not with the same trading partner; this creates the potential for
punishing bad behavior. Second, performance or breach must be observable, in the sense
that there is a shared understanding among potential future trading partners of what
constitutes good or bad behavior. Third, a party’s behavior in one exchange also must be
observable in a different sense; the party’s actual performance – whether the party
behaved badly or whether it performed as anticipated – must be observable by potential
future trading partners.15
These factors have implications that limit the kind of market that can be supported
by reputation-based exchange, all of which will restrict the level of commercial activity
in that market. Professor Avinash Dixit, in his model of relation-based exchange, uses
the concept of “distance” to express the limiting impact of these factors.16 The choice of
the term invokes the language of physical distance as a metaphor for the investment in
information necessary to establish and maintain a reputation for contractual performance.
15
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Physical distance makes information costly to transmit in the absence of advanced
technology.
Similarly, both a shared understanding of what constitutes performance and the
observability of breach depend, in the end, on the cost of information transmission. The
common values that underlay a shared understanding of performance under differing
circumstances must be transmitted among future trading partners; as conditions change
and values evolve, new information must be transmitted. Communicating this
information is a function of distance: it is more costly and less successful to communicate
both with traders who are physically distant from the core of market participants, and
with traders who are socially distant from the core, whether by culture, language or
class.17
Correspondingly, it is more costly to communicate the necessary information to
sustain reputation-based transactions that are new or complicated: the concept of
performance that must be shared requires more information and more new information,
and lacks the shared understandings that define adequate performance in the traditional
markets. The result is straightforward. “[C]heating becomes more attractive the more
distant the partner.”18
The scope and scale of a reputation-supported market is thus defined by a tradeoff
between the gains from trading with more distant partners, who may offer different skills
and goods and at least additional volume, and the increased costs associated with
transmitting information to them. These costs increase in the distance to the marginal
17
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trader, while the accuracy of a trader’s reputation decreases in that distance. The
implication is that the size of the market depends on information technology: the better
the technology, the lower the cost of transmitting shared values and performance
information and, therefore, the less distant potential trading partners are from each other
and the larger the size of the market that can be supported by reputation. This
relationship between information costs and the size and diversity of a reputation-based
market creates the role for corporations to reduce the costs of establishing and sustaining
such a market.19
II. Corporations as Long-Lived Repositories of Reputation
David Kreps, in a well known essay on the economics of corporate culture, argues
that a corporation can play a special role in a reputation-based market because of its
superior capacity to establish and maintain a reputation. 20 Recall that the stability of a
reputation market depends on a party’s assessment that there will a sufficiently long
series of transactions with an existing trading partner, or with future trading partners with
access to the party’s prior performance, to prevent anticipation of a rollback cascade from
subverting contractual performance in the first place. As discussed in the previous Part,
the length of anticipated dealings prevents an equilibrium of voluntary performance of
19
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obligations from unraveling into cheating in the current round once it can be expected
that there will be a final round in which it will be in a party’s interest to cheat.21 In
contrast to individuals who die or retire, corporations have an infinite life; they will not
necessarily have a final period that triggers a cascade into current non-performance. As a
result, corporations will invest more in establishing a reputation and be more diligent
about protecting one. As Kreps puts it, “The firm is a wholly intangible object in this
theory – a reputation bearer.”22
One additional step is necessary to enable the corporation to function as a longlived reputation bearer. As a formal matter, a corporation is just a long-lived piece of
paper on which appears the corporation’s charter. The corporation’s decisions – in our
context, to perform its contractual obligations or not – are made by individuals with finite
professional lives. It may be in the corporation’s interest – that is, in the interest of future
owners of the corporation – for it to invest in establishing a reputation and then invest in
sustaining it by performing its obligations to trading partners, because those investments
will pay off over the corporation’s infinite life. But the investment will not be made
unless it is also to the advantage of the short-lived individuals who actually make the
corporation’s decisions. For example, if all profits are currently paid out and the decision
makers have no way to benefit from the value of the corporation’s reputation when they
retire, then the corporation, in effect, will have a final period determined not by the
corporation’s infinite life, but by its current owners’ mortality.

21

The unraveling reasoning is that a potential trading partner will also know that the party will not perform
in the final round, so it will anticipate that behavior and not perform in the next-to-last round, which will be
anticipated by the first party, and so on back to non-performance in the current round.
22
Kreps, supra note 20, at 111.

11

Krep’s solution to the problem of causing short-lived individuals to think like a
long-lived corporation is to allow the current generation of decision makers to sell their
position (equity) to the next generation of decision makers. By allowing the current
generation to secure a payment based on the discounted value of future corporate
earnings, they then have an incentive to value the corporation’s future dealings beyond
the length of their own careers, and therefore to make efficient current investments in the
corporation’s reputation, because what they will receive for their positions is a function
of the value of the corporation’s future trading.23
The value of a long-lived reputation bearer in a jurisdiction with bad commercial
law now should be apparent. Developing long-lived bearers of reputations as trading
partners reduces the costs of building reputations – one reputation lasts a long time – and,
by reducing the number of participants over time, reduces the costs a trading partner must
incur to learn the reputation of potential trading partners. The resulting reduction in
information costs decreases the distance between traders and therefore increases the
range of parties with whom any single trader can contract. In turn, this increases the size,
scale and diversity of the market that reputation-based trading can support and, in the
end, increases productivity and economic growth.
III. The Family as a More Efficient Reputation Bearer
In fact, the strategy of reducing information costs through trading partners
organizing production in long-lived corporations, and thereby increasing the size and
scale of reputation-supported product markets, is more complicated than the discussion

23

Id. at 108-110. Other techniques also can be used to bond future reputation, such as making observable
investments in assets that will be valuable only if the corporation is successful. See Klein & Leffler, supra
note 8. However, all strategies require confronting the time preferences of the corporation’s short-lived
decision makers.

12

thus far has acknowledged. As we saw in Part II., Kreps gives current corporate decision
makers the incentive to invest in long-term reputation by organizing the corporation so
that the decision makers can sell their stake in the corporation before retiring. This
eliminates the problem of the decision makers facing a final period even if the
corporation does not. But this temporal arbitrage does not quite work.
In Kreps’ account, the arrangement that creates the incentive for the decision
makers to cause the corporation to invest in reputation that will pay off after their careers
end, and which makes that reputation credible to potential trading partners, is part of the
corporation’s internal governance structure. This structure is not readily observable by
potential outside trading partners; the information costs of learning about the
corporation’s internal characteristics, which are central to a trading partner relying on the
corporation’s reputation, are very high. At this point, poor shareholder protection law (in
addition to poor commercial law) enters the analysis. An effective corporate disclosure
regime will require the corporation to make public the structure of its owners’ and
managers’ incentives, thereby reducing the costs of acquiring this information not only
by the capital market, but by potential trading partners as well. Without the ready
availability of such information, the corporation may not succeed as a long-lived
reputation bearer because trading partners will have no credible reason to believe that the
relevant reputation is that of the corporation rather than the short-lived decision maker.
Recent corporate governance debates demonstrate that the problem of high
information costs concerning the incentives of corporate decision makers, and the
difficulty of evaluating them even if disclosed, are hardly theoretical. Not long ago,
criticism of the U.S. corporate governance system claimed that the incentive structures of
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U.S. corporations resulted in myopic planning, with too high a discount rate being
applied in the capital budgeting process. German and Japanese corporations, in contrast,
were said to be long-term oriented because their decision makers faced a different, more
patient, incentive structure. Not many years later, the direction of the debate had
switched, with the U.S. system lauded as providing incentives to innovate that were not
present in the more conservative German and Japanese governance systems.24 Even
more recently, the argument has shifted again. Executive compensation scandals,
concerning both the absolute amounts paid and the integrity of the process by which
stock options were granted, at least raise questions concerning the incentive structure that
had been said to support innovation, as well as doubts concerning the observability of
managerial incentives even in the United States, the jurisdiction with what is likely the
best shareholder protection.25
My point is not to extend this continually shifting debate, but only to note that it is
very hard to get the corporation’s internal incentives right even when you are trying.26
And the harder it is to get it right, the higher the information costs associated with an
outside potential trading partner trying to assess whether the corporate decision makers
have the right incentives to cause the corporation to make investments in its long term
reputation for performing its contractual obligations with trading partners. The harder it
24
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is to evaluate internal incentives, the more assessment of a particular company matters,
and the more a particular trading partner has to know to assess the corporation’s
reputation. Of course, this company-specific information is costly, especially in a
jurisdiction with weak shareholder protection, and the resulting impact on a reputationbased commercial market should be clear. The increased cost of assessing reputation
increases the distance between potential traders, and reduces the size and scale of
commercial activity that can be supported. Krep’s conception of the corporation as a
bearer of reputation thus in part founders on the barriers to transmitting the information
on which the corporation’s reputation depends.
Here, finally, is where family ownership comes into the account. When the
corporation is owned by a family, the internal incentives become much more transparent.
The problem with Kreps’ model is the need for an intergenerational transfer between the
current and the next generation of corporate decision makers so that current decisions
will take long-term reputation creation into account. In turn, the transfer mechanism has
to be observable to potential future traders, a communication process that can be expected
to be costly when the mechanism and its underlying incentive structure has to be set out
in an explicit contract. In contrast, family ownership solves the intergenerational transfer
process rather elegantly. Because of intra-family inheritance and family ties, the current
generation of decision makers, at least in functional family businesses, treats the next
generation’s utility as the equivalent of their own, so there is no temporal distortion of
incentives to invest in reputation.
The critical point is that family ownership substitutes for internal incentive and
transfer mechanisms as an assurance of the corporation’s commitment to long-term
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reputation, but with one important difference. Family ownership is much more easily
observed by potential trading partners; so long as cultural values concerning family
support the belief that current decision makers are committed to inter-generational utility
equivalence,27 information concerning the corporation’s commitment to contractual
performance is cheaper to transmit.
By this point, it is apparent where the argument is going. The combination of
Kreps’ insight that, because of its infinite life, the corporation can be an effective bearer
of a long-term reputation for contractual performance, with the fact that family ownership
can be a low cost way of communicating to potential trading partners that the corporation
values future trading, increases the size and scale of the reputation-based trading market.
If the corporation is the bearer of reputation, family substitutes for internal contract as the
corporation’s DNA. In an environment of bad law – both commercial and shareholder
protection – controlling family corporations will have an evolutionary advantage.28
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While it is beyond my ambition to fully explore the implications of this
conclusion here, I will address one such implication to provide an example of what is
possible. It is commonplace in developing countries that family controlled companies are
conglomerates, operating in a range of different industries that do not share production
economies of any type, whether scale, scope or vertical integration. The two most
familiar explanations for conglomerate organization in this setting are financial. First, in
the absence of an efficient external capital market, an internal capital market in which
project funding is determined not by the market, but by the corporation’s internal capital
budgeting process, may well be more effective. Of course, this explanation is consistent
with the capital market-oriented bad law argument: poor shareholder protection means
poor disclosure, which in turn means an informationally inefficient capital market. Thus,
a conglomerate serves to internalize the capital allocation process.29 Second, a
controlling shareholder bears the cost of non-diversification, especially where a weak
local capital market makes laying off risk costly. A conglomerate strategy allows
diversification at the company level, where it benefits the controlling shareholder. 30

future clients, therefore reduces the barriers to the operation of a reputation market in an adverse selection
driven model, just as it does in Kreps’ moral hazard approach. To be fair, Tadelis does briefly consider the
possibility that family ownership might address the adverse selection problem, but dismisses the fact of
family ownership as providing too little information to support a separation between good and bad service
providers: “Clearly, businesses that have signs claiming that they have owned by the same family for 75
years convey little information about the quality of the current owner, let alone of the key employees.” Id.
at 560. In settings where family ownership powerfully predicts individual family member preferences for
business success, Tadelis dismisses the impact of family ownership too quickly. His point might be better
understood as a prediction of regression to the mean in talent as control shifts from the business’ founder to
her heirs. There is some empirical evidence that supports this inference. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 166869 (reviewing studies).
29
See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An
Analysis of Diversified Business Groups, 55 J. Fin. 868 (2000)(explaining the advantages of an internal
capital market in emerging market jurisdictions).
30
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 332-57
(2nd ed. 1995)(reviewing explanations for conglomerate acquisitions).
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A third explanation for conglomerate organization in developing countries,
building on the role of family ownership developed in this Part, is product market rather
than capital market focused. The conjecture is that family control combines with Kreps’
conception of the corporation as a reputation bearer to reduce the information costs
associated with maintaining a reputation. Because in a country with bad commercial law
all transactions are reputation-based, investment in reputation produces an asset subject to
both economies of scale and scope. Once family ownership is established, the marginal
cost of transmitting that fact, and thereby providing a foundation for reputation-based
trading, is decreasing with scale. And the same forces that create reputational scale
economies within a single industry also create reputational scope economies across
industries, because reputation for contractual performance need not be industry specific
where the performance uncertainty is integrity not capacity. To be sure, the cost of
information transmission may be initially higher when the corporation enters a new
industry, so that potential traders in that industry are at a greater functional distance from
the corporation; nevertheless, family ownership remains a less costly fact to convey.
IV. Why Minority Shareholders?
We now move to a more speculative but also more narrowly defined question of
how the product market influences the distribution of shareholders in the capital market.
The role of family ownership in supporting self-enforcing corporate commercial
exchange explains family control of corporations in developing countries, but it does not
itself explain public ownership of a minority stake in the family-controlled corporation,
also a familiar element of shareholder distribution in developing countries.31 Thus far in

31

A number of explanations have been advanced for why a controlling shareholder would want to establish
public minority shareholders, whether in an initial public offering or in a spin out public sale of a minority
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the analysis, the product market explanation for family ownership shares this gap with the
Law and Finance explanation of concentrated ownership. As discussed in the
introduction, a bad shareholder protection explanation for the prevalence of controlling
shareholders does not explain why we observe any minority shareholders. If investors
know that there is an effective upper bound on the amount of private benefits that a
controlling shareholder can divert, then they will pay a fair price for the earnings that
remain and earn a fair return on their investment even if the trading price for minority
shares is significantly below that for controlling shares to reflect the diversion. The
problem is that the literature does not reveal the source of that upper bound.32
One could imagine that the need for controlling shareholders to return to the
capital market to raise equity in the future could support an upper bound – an expected
decrease in the price paid in the next offering would decrease the incentive to divert
following the first. There is, however, reason to be skeptical of this explanation. As a
factual matter, such companies do not frequently return to the capital market for equity,
sharing that characteristic with public corporations in developed countries. The
explanation may be simply a bad shareholder protection variant of a pecking order theory
interest in a previously wholly owned subsidiary. These include the evaluative information provided by the
pricing of an efficient stock market and the availability of publicly traded shares as an incentive
compensation vehicle. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders,
152 U.Pa. L.Rev. 785, 791(2003)(summarizing benefits to controlling shareholder from having a publicly
traded minority); Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, A Comparison of Equity Carve-outs and Seasoned
Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructuring, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 182 (1986)(information
affect of minority carve out). Such information-based explanations, however, require an efficient stock
market, a condition that is not consistent with poor shareholder protection law.
32
Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, should Business Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of
Efficient Internal Capital Markets (working paper, July 2004, forthcoming Journal of Financial
Economics), available at SSRN.com/abstract+732184, provide a good example. In Almeida and
Wolfeszon’s model, the extent to which the controlling shareholder can divert assets is expressed as the
“pledgebility” parameter; the model then yields different results depending on the extent to which returns
can be effectively committed to minority investors. However, there is not discussion of the institutional
structure that allows an effective commitment not to divert more than a particular value of the parameter.
Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 2 (2002),
use a similar modeling technique to parametize the level of diversion.
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of capital structure.33 This theory posits that a company’s choice of what securities to
issue turns on the informational asymmetry between the company and prospective
investors, and that the asymmetry is more significant the riskier the security. As a result,
a company will use retained earnings to finance its activities when it can, with debt the
second choice (less risky than equity because debt has priority), and equity (whose value
is dependent on the most risky part of the company’s future earnings) as the last resort.
Because the difficulty of securing credible information about future corporate
performance, which underlies valuation of an equity offering, is much greater in a bad
shareholder protection jurisdiction, information asymmetry and equity’s place at the
bottom of the pecking order is reinforced. Thus, the cost difference between bank
financing or internal financing on the one hand, and equity financing on the other, should
be substantially greater than in a good shareholder protection jurisdiction.
The need to return to the equity market is therefore not a likely source of an upper
bound for controlling shareholder private benefit extraction in bad shareholder protection
jurisdiction; cost considerations make equity capital an even less attractive source of
financing in these jurisdictions than in those with good shareholder protection. Indeed, it
is a two-sided puzzle, with the possibility of a lemons’ market on both sides: why do
companies choose to pay the very high price for equity given the bad shareholder
protection discount and the availability of cheaper alternatives; and why do minority
shareholders purchase any shares at all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private

33

See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 49096 (8th ed. 2006); Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance 450-53
(7th ed. 2005).
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benefit extraction? Without more, both issuers and investors should shun this segment of
the capital market.34
An attractively more straightforward, but still troublesomely vague source for a
ceiling on private benefit extraction is the intuition that even in a bad shareholder
protection jurisdiction, the courts or regulators (or someone in authority) will act if a
controlling shareholder is too greedy or too blatant in his exploitation of the minority.
Perhaps even other controlling shareholders will support action against behavior that,
because of the extremity of its revealed avarice, calls attention to the more measured
diversion of others, something of an honor among thieves argument (or, less
judgmentally, a private ordering solution to enforcement).35 But here the problem is how
the market knows what the self or collectively imposed ceiling is. Even if the market is
informationally efficient, in the sense that it is an unbiased estimate of the ceiling’s
height, the estimate is likely to vary widely around the unobservable true value. Because
all companies with a controlling shareholder will present the risk of uncertainty in the
height of the ceiling, which cannot be diversified away in the national market, the
minority share discount will be driven even higher.
If instead we approach the problem of locating a ceiling on private benefit
extraction from a product market perspective rather than a capital market perspective, an
alternative explanation is possible, although it shares a troublesome vagueness with the
unofficial ceiling on diversion explanation just considered. In this product market- based
explanation, minority shareholders may play an important reputation role in jurisdictions
with both bad shareholder protection and bad commercial law. As we saw in Part I, the

34
35

Gilson, supra note 1, at 1674-78, addresses possible responses to these adverse selection problems.
See Grief, supra note 17, at 732-35; Richman, supra note 19, at 2338-48.
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cost of transmitting performance information is critical to the scale of the reputationbased product market that can be supported. Suppose that the treatment of minority
shareholders is visible to a company’s potential trading partners at a low cost, perhaps
because such exploitation is covered by the local newspapers.36 Fair treatment of
minority shareholders then serves as evidence of the corporation’s integrity, including its
commitment to performing its contractual obligations, a signal that is credible because it
is costly – some extraction of private benefits of control must be given up. If the family
controlled corporation does not cheat in easy (because of poor shareholder protection)
ways by exploiting minority shareholders, the reasoning goes, the controlling family
shareholder also will not cheat its customers.37
The decision to have minority shareholders then can be explained not by the need
for capital at the time of the initial public offering or in the future, but as a way of
developing reputation that will be valuable in the product market (and which may justify
the higher cost of capital for a one time issuance of minority shares). From this
perspective, minority shareholders play the role of reputational canaries, whose value is
that they help credibly convey to potential traders that the corporation is an honest trading
partner. The analysis is akin to Klein and Leffler’s argument that reputation for product
quality is supported by sellers investing in long-lived assets unrelated to product quality
36

See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 5, at 582-86(treating newspapers as a corporate governance constraint).
Luca Enriques has pointed out that the role of the financial press may be limited to a handful of developed
countries where there is a widespread confidence in the newspapers journalistic integrity. Absent that
confidence, they cannot play the contemplated “shaming” role. Private correspondence with the author.
37
I recognize that I am at this point glossing over a serious problem – why is a controlling shareholder’s
treatment of minority shareholders more observable than the quality of the products or services it
provides? Or setting the bar at a realistically lower level, is the controlling shareholder’s treatment of
minority shareholders sufficiently observable that it adds something to the customer’s assessment of the
corporation’s reputation based only on the products or services it provides? I will return to this concern
after describing the product market explanation for minority shareholders in family controlled corporations.
TAN 37-38 infra.
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(like expensive offices for public accounting firms) whose value drops sharply if the
company fails as a result of providing poor quality goods or services.38 More generally,
think of corporate investment in image advertising; its principal value is demonstrating
something about corporate character, which is believed to influence potential customers’
assessment of the corporation’s product or service. In our context, the investment (or
image advertising) is foregoing poor treatment of minority shareholders, which requires
having minority shareholders in the first place.
To be sure, this preliminary account of a product market-based role of minority
shareholders is far from complete. The most significant gap that remains is how potential
trading partners know what the acceptable level of diversion is, so they can know when
the canary is gasping. In this respect, the account suffers from the same problem as does
the explanation that there is an unofficial ceiling on diversion that is both observable by
minority shareholders and observed by controlling shareholders. As developed in Part I,
any reputation-based account of exchange – here the account is cross-market with
reputation in the capital market supporting exchange in the product market – requires a
shared understanding of what constitutes appropriate performance, now with respect to
treatment of minority shareholders.
While it is beyond my ambition here to fully develop the product market-based
account, the shape of a hypothesis does take form. The gap in an informal ceiling on
diversion explanation for the presence of minority shareholders is that one still is left
without an explanation for why one wants minority shareholders in the first place given
less costly alternatives of bank financing or internally generated funds. The product
market-based account provides an answer to why the family corporation might want
38

Klein & Leffler, supra note 8.
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minority shareholders – because of the impact of their treatment on the corporation’s
reputation in the product market – but still requires a mechanism by which fair treatment
is visible to the family corporation’s customers. An important difference between the
two accounts, however, is that the product market-based explanation of minority
shareholders as a signal of commitment to contractual performance at least provides an
enforcement mechanism. In the product market account, mistreatment of minority
shareholders will be punished in the product market. In a setting in which the corporation
need not return to the equity market, the informal enforcement explanation does not
explain how mistreatment of minority shareholders in excess of the norm is punished at
all; rather, like the economist’s joke about being stranded on a desert island, it simply
assumes unspecified informal enforcement through an unidentified actor.
Turning now to the observability problem with a product market-based
explanation of minority shareholders, the product market account starts with two
advantages. First, the controlling family shareholder in the product market-based account
has a clear incentive to make its treatment of minority shareholders observable to product
market customers; without that disclosure, there is no reason to have the minority
shareholders at all. Second, the observability of minority shareholder treatment need not
be perfect. Rather, the signal of fair treatment of minority shareholders need only add
information to the direct information the corporation’s customers receive concerning the
quality of its contractual performance. Here the point is not merely whether the product
market-based explanation for the existence of minority shareholders is better than an
informal enforcement explanation – even if better, both explanations could be wrong –
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but whether, net of its cost, it adds anything to the operation of the product market’s
direct transmission of information concerning product quality.
There is good reason to think that the capital market signal of product quality sent
by the treatment of minority shareholders adds to a customer’s information set
concerning product quality. Here the idea is that assessing product quality is difficult in a
jurisdiction with poor commercial law. The experience of an individual customer may be
a noisy measure of overall producer quality, even to the particular customer – did the
customer receive a bad lot or was the seller simply a poor producer? Given the barriers to
actual observation in a jurisdiction with poor commercial law – for example, where
techniques like warranties are not viable – room exists for a signal of quality that
supplements a customer’s direct observation. Additionally, the minority shareholder
signal may have a cost advantage over further direct observation of product quality. The
minority shareholder signal is given by the family controlled corporation; additional
direct information concerning product quality in a bad commercial law jurisdiction
requires aggregation of information from many parties, the institutions for which may be
expensive to create and which require significant collective action.
This analysis still leaves a gap: how does the controlling family shareholder make
its signal of fair treatment of the minority credible? But this is an acceptable place to
stop in describing what, in the end, is meant only to be a hypothesis. Signals have to be
understood in a context, and their development is dynamic: a signaler changes its signal
as it better understands the recipients’ response. For now, it is enough that a hypothesis
of a product market-based explanation of the existence of minority shareholders in family
controlled corporations is plausible. It is more completely specified that an informal
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enforcement explanation and it need not be a better signal of quality than producers’
direct provision of information – it need only add to the total information the customer
receives. My claim is that the product market-based account is worth our thinking about.
Of course, a product market/reputation account and an informal enforce ceiling
are not are not mutually exclusive, nor are they the only approaches to explaining why
family controlled companies in developing markets have minority shareholders. Yet
another account places the motive for the existence of minority shareholders in the realm
of political economy. In many emerging market countries, having a stock market is like
having a national airline – a badge of modernity that does not demand an economic
justification. The government wants a stock market; the company goes along by issuing
equity and paying the higher cost of capital – a tax of sorts – and the individual investors
buy equity for the same reason that Americans buy state lottery tickets, or because few
alternative investments are available. This account also lacks a ceiling on private benefit
extraction, but one can imagine that if the government wants to have a stock market, it
may have the capacity to enforce, however informally, a particular ceiling.39 In any
event, elements of a product market/reputation account, an informal ceiling account, and
a vanity stock market account for minority shareholders all may be operative; and the
relative importance of each may differ depending on the context of a particular national
market. The key is understanding the range of explanations that may be at work.
V. The Dynamics of Reputation-Based Exchange
39

The enforcement of a Japanese main bank’s obligation to undertake a rescue of its clients has been said
to operate in this informal way. While a main bank had no formal legal obligation to undertake a rescue,
the Ministry of Finance had to approve applications to open new bank branches, a decision that was left
entirely in the Ministry of Finance’s discretion. The failure to discharge the informal rescue obligation
would be punished by the denial of branch applications. See Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard,
The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in The Japanese Main Bank System 3, 27-32
(M. Aoki & H. Patrick eds., 1994).
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This brings us to the final element of our assessment of family controlled
corporations in developing markets. To this point, the analysis has been largely static,
with attention focused on the conditions necessary for reputationally-based self enforcing
exchange, and the complementary shareholder distribution in jurisdictions with bad
commercial law. I want to close with a preliminary consideration of the dynamics of
such markets, to the end of framing a central question about national economic
development: How does a nation make the leap from reputationally-based to anonymous,
rule of law-based commercial relationships that is necessary to sustain economic growth?
A reputation-based commercial system can grow quickly.40 However, such a
system runs into an upper bound. For example, the distance-limited size of the market
for a particular product discussed in Part IV forces a corporation to expand into unrelated
businesses to achieve economies of scale and scope associated with its reputation. This
strategy comes, however, with a cost: production of unrelated products with which the
corporation has no experience will be less efficient. As with any expansion, decreasing
returns on reputation will set in at the margin as sales extend to trading partners at a
greater “distance.” At the same time, marginal costs will increase with “distance” as a
result of expanding into new geographical markets, and expanding into unrelated but
geographically proximate businesses, both from lack of experience and from the
difficulty of managing the growing number of different industries in which the nowconglomerate corporation participates. Because both the number of potential traders
within a feasible reputation-distance from the corporation, and the number of industries
in which the firm can successfully operate, have finite limits, sooner or later economic
growth in reputation-based product markets slows down.
40

See Dixit, supra note 13 at 82; Li, supra note 8.
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At this point, the jurisdiction has to transform its commercial law to a system that
provides effective formal enforcement of contractual obligations in order to extend the
reach of its producers to buyers too distant to rely entirely on reputation-based selfenforcement.41 However, this process is unlikely to be linear, and ultimately may not
succeed. As Dixit reasons, “[t]he fixed costs of rule-based governance are a public
investment; therefore society must solve a collective action problem to put such a system
in place. This is not automatic; there are the usual problems of free-riding,
underestimation of the benefits to future generations in today’s political process, and the
veto power of those who stand to lose from the change.”42 The potential for those who
have been most successful in the relation-based economy to resist transition to a rule of
law-based system is a matter of particular concern. Precisely those families who the
existing relation-based system most advantages, and who therefore have the greatest
system-specific investment in reputation, have the most to lose from the reduction in
entry barriers caused by a system transition to rule of law-based formal enforcement,43
and who likely also have the most political influence. As Mancur Olson has argued,
these families will have both the incentive and the resources to make more difficult, or to
block, the development of new formal institutions that devalue the families’ investment
in relation-supporting institutions.44

41

Both Dixit, supra note 13, at 80-82, and Li, supra note 8, at 659-61, stress this point. Douglass North has
stated that “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”
North, supra note 14, at 54.
42
Dixit, supra note 13, at 80.
43
For example, in a system with good commercial law, contractual commitments like warranties can
provide new entrants a substitute for difficult to acquire reputation. When KIA, a Korean automobile
manufacturer entered the U.S. market, it offered a substantially longer warranty than its established
competitors.
44
Mancur Olsen, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982). Almeida & Wolfezon, supra note __, make the
same point about conglomerates in developing countries. Once conglomerates become a large enough part
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As a result, economic growth may falter or turn negative in this transition period,
when existing relation-based institutions are becoming less efficient and their
replacement by rule of law-based commercial institutions is not yet complete. The same
institutions that made the economy grow so quickly during its early development period
then operate as a barrier to effective transition, a phenomenon that Paul Milgrom and
John Roberts call “supermodularity.”45 As they put it, "(e)ven if a coordinate adjustment
on all relevant dimensions might yield an improvement in performance, it may be that
until all the features of the new pattern have been implemented, the performance of the
system may be much worse than in the original position."46 Indeed, John Shuhe Li
ascribes the shift between the “East Asian Miracle” and the “East Asian Financial Crisis”
to just such a phenomenon: “The dismantling of too many existing relationship-specific
mechanisms in so short a period can damage the future potential of economies at an early
stage of development to catch up; i.e., before reaching the turning point where relationbased governance is still more cost-effective than rule-based governance… .”47
VI. Conclusion: How is the Transition to Rule of Law Enforcement Accomplished?
The function of shareholder distribution looks quite different when approached
from the product market side than from the capital market side. While the absence of
effective minority shareholder protection may in some circumstances explain the absence

of the economy, they may impose a negative externality by causing the overall capital market to operate
inefficiently, even if the conglomerates’ internal capital markets operate efficiently as a result of a kind of
crowding out phenomenon. In this setting, government intervention may be necessary to reduce the
conglomerates’ role
45
Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complimentarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic
Organization, 1 Estudios Economicos 3, 12 (1994).
46
Id.
47
Li, supra note 8, at 669.
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of corporations whose shares are widely held,48 it does not explain why we observe
minority holdings at all, nor the special role of controlling family shareholders in many
countries. From the perspective of the product market, shareholder distribution,
including family control, may play a role in the facilitating the corporation’s operation as
a reputation bearer in markets where commercial exchange is supported by reputation
rather than formal enforcement.
A focus on shareholder distribution from a product market perspective also
highlights the importance of a dynamic account of the institutions necessary for economic
growth. For developing economies, reputation-based markets can develop more easily
and grow more quickly than markets that support anonymous trading, because the
institutional structure of a system based on formal enforcement is both more expensive
and more difficult to develop. Formal enforcement requires the rule of law, and a well
functioning government.49
The problem is transition. The institutions that supported relation-based
exchange, and in which the families that have been most successful have large
investments, ultimately become barriers to further development; a public choice analysis
48

Recent scholarship suggests that in some countries causation may run in the opposite direction. Julian
Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with Family: The Decline of Family
Ownership in the UK, in The History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups
to Professional Managers (Randall Morck ed. 2005), and Brian Cheffins, Brian R. Cheffins, Are Good
Managers Required for a Separation of Ownership and Control?, 13 Indus. & Corp. Change 591 (2004),
argue that U.K. shareholding patterns arose from informal relations of trust and confidence that encouraged
equity investment by investors geographically proximate to the issuer. Here the influence is from product
market to capital market. This diversity in actual history among jurisdictions is consistent with Avner
Grief’s conclusion that the structure of reputation markets in individual countries will be path dependent.
Because “cultural beliefs and behavioral norms will coordinate expectations and provide a shared
understanding of the meaning of various actions. Ceteris paribus, initial social structures and cultural
features therefore influence which, among the many possible organic [reputation market structures] will
emerge… .” Grief, supra note 17, at 762. See sources in note 24 supra (discussing path dependency of
corporate governance institutions).
49
See Kenneth Damm, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance, John M. Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper Sieries, 2nd ed., No. 303 (September 2006), available at ssrn..com/abstract_id=932694
(surveying literature).
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suggests that those who have succeeded in a relation-based economy will resist the
transition to formal enforcement. The politics of transition then are driven by the size of
one’s piece, rather than the size of the pie. If this analysis is plausible, we are left with a
task and a conjecture. The task is to develop a dynamic account: what breaks the
transition log jam – how does a country overcome the political barriers to shifting the
character of its product markets by supplementing reputation with rule of law-based
formal enforcement.50 The conjecture, which I am pursuing in work with Curtis
Milhaupt, is that, in countries that in recent years have successfully made the switch, the
architects of the institutional and market transition were what we term “economically
benevolent dictators,” whose political power allowed the imposition of their individual
utility function – continued economic growth even at the expense of (or by buying off)
influential families51 If this conjecture turns out to explain some of the variance in
development between different nations, the task is not to find more dictators –
economically benevolent dictators, even if one could find them, have not been benevolent
along other important dimensions – but instead to understand the function that they play
and then to design less oppressive substitutes.
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Avner Grief and David Laitin provide an analytic road map for developing a dynamic account of system
change, noting that a game theoretic account explains an equilibrium, not what causes a system to shift to a
new equilibrium. Avner Greif & David Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 633 (2004). A shift resulting from changed external conditions is easy enough to explain – the
rules of the game have changed. The harder question is to explain how systems change as a result of
internal forces. Given the equilibrium analysis, “[e]ndongenous institutional change appears, then, to be a
contradiction in terms.” Id. at 633.
51
Fareed Zakaria makes a related claim whose point is to explain the development of democratic
government rather than economic development. He argues that the success of democracy is a function of
per capita GDP. In his view, the first step toward representative government is economic development,
which may require a dictator, but which also then creates the middle class that will bring the dictator down.
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom 69-73 (2004). Played through Grief and Laitin’s model, supra note
49, this would be an example of an equilibrium whose circumstances undermine its stability.
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